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SOCIOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHY: A PROMISING RELATIONSHIP?
WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT, PARENTAL IDENTITY
AND FERTILITY IN EUROPE.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAMILY AND GENDER ROLES
For Europe in the 1990s, and in the longer run for the world, however, demography’s most
fundamental problem is to explain why adults in rich countries, who have choice in the matter,
continue to choose to have any children at all, and in so far as they do, if there is any enduring
reason over and above transient social pressures, why the average should be around two
children rather than some other number, possibly a much smaller one.’ (Coleman 1996: 48)
‘There are three main tendencies working for extreme family limitation: the feeling of insecurity
in modern life, particularly with regard to economic support; the cumbersomeness of children
and difficulty of fitting their lives into the pattern of adult life in modern civilisation, particularly
in the cities; and the fact that children exert a greater and greater pressure on the family
economy. Can any means be found that would tend to counterbalance these tendencies?’
(Myrdal, 1941:119)
1.- Introduction: below replacement levels of fertility and their implications for
sociology and demography
The purpose of this paper is twofold: it argues that sociology can learn much from demography
- and vice versa – and that such an interdisciplinary approach is fruitful for understanding
recent demographic developments in Europe. Second it reviews a number of empirical sources,
and in particular the 1994 ISSP survey ‘Family and Gender Roles II’ to make the case for
developing the concept of ‘parental identity’ in order to analyse the causes of low fertility
levels. This concept can be seen as a useful example of an analysis that is rooted in both
disciplines.
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All European and almost all OECD member countries have now experienced below
replacement levels of fertility1for a substantial time. Graph 1 shows the post-war pattern for all
EU member countries. As is well known, this change has been particularly great in countries
such as Italy and Spain. In the latter, the total fertility rate fell from 2.8 to 1.2 between 1975 and
1995. However other countries have recorded substantial if less dramatic changes. Graph 2
shows the change for Scotland. An illustration of the scale of these developments is the actual
number of births occurring each year. In 1964 the peak year of the post-war baby boom in
Scotland, there were over 104 thousand births. In 2001, there were 52,527: barely half the
number of forty years before and the lowest figures recorded since registration started. The
decline has been faster in Scotland than in the rest of the UK, but there has not yet been any
research about why (Randall 2002).
Graph 1. -

























                                                
1 The replacement rate of fertility is the rate at which the population of a society, net of migration, would
remain stable. In contemporary societies this occurs with a total fertility rate of around 2.1. The total fertility
rate is a measure that expresses the number of births that each woman in a society would have were she to
bear children in accordance with the current average age specific fertility rates in that society.
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As well as sociological interest, low and falling fertility rates have policy implications because
of their short and medium term consequences for the age structure of the population, age-
dependency ratios and immigration, and, in the longer term, for population levels, and according
to observers as diverse as Marx (1973) and Chesnais (1998) for the power of states. The latter
points to the modern historical congruence between high fertility and imperial expansion. Birth
rates are far more important for age structure and population trends of contemporary societies
than mortality rates. Coale (1956) showed some decades ago that even if the population of the
United States achieved immortality it would raise the population by only about 25% (unless
scientific developments were to prolong the human age of fertility substantially). Conversely
low fertility has dramatic consequences in the long run. McDonald (2000) has shown that at
current fertility rates (even if there were no further fall) the population of Italy or Spain would
be reduced to a few million by the end of this century. Chesnais (1998) illustrates the dramatic
difference between higher and lower fertility over time by contrasting two scenarios for
Germany. In the first its fertility rate at the start of the C20 is imagined to remain constant over
that century and this one. In the second this fertility rate is replaced with that of contemporary
Germany. The first scenario produces a Germany with a population of some 650 million in
2100, in the second only 6 million are left!












S ource: Randal l 2002.
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2.- The causes of below replacement level fertility rates
A growing literature has offered various explanations for these trends. The factors singled out
for comment can be grouped into three categories, although they are mostly interrelated, so that
a number of different typologies are equally plausible:
Changes in family forms:
increases in the age first marriage;
increases in the age of women at first births;
increasing rates of cohabitation, separation and divorce;
increased incidence of single parent households and ‘step-families’;
more diverse family forms (e.g. living apart together, same sex couples).
Changes in economy and society:
increases in women’s, especially mothers’ employment;
increased difficulty of balancing employment and family obligations;
increased relative scarcity of time;
increased ‘cumbersomeness’ of children in urban, mobile environments;
increased individualism and associated social and spatial mobility;
decline of patriarchal authority and women’s subordination;
changes in the form and timing of the intergenerational transfer of wealth.
Changes in fertility attitudes and behaviour:
increased availability, knowledge and use of contraception and abortion;
falls in ideal family size;
decreased infant mortality;
innovations in reproductive technology.
However although there is some consensus about the kinds of factors that might explain chronic
fertility decline, sometimes known as the ‘second demographic transition’ (Van de Kaa 1988),
there is little agreement about how different factors might interrelate, how they operate, or
directions of cause and effect. Chesnais (1998 93) argues that ‘[d]emographers do not have a
clear causal framework, only intuition regarding a puzzle of changes affecting all spheres of
daily life’. There are perhaps three reasons for this. Until recently demography, a discipline
partly shaped by policy considerations, has been more concerned with the issue of high fertility
in developing countries and the nature and timing of the demographic transition there, rather
than with the heartlands of the world economy. This is now changing (Demeny1997) as
governments become concerned with the policy implications of ageing populations. Second (as
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I discuss in section 9) there is an unresolved controversy within economic approaches to
demography about whether increased living standards ultimately increases or reduces the
number of children that families want. This debate reaches back to the very origins of the
discipline in the ideas of Malthus (1817). And in part it is because there has perhaps been
insufficient exchange of ideas between sociology and demography.
Third, until very recently, most contemporary sociology has paid little attention to demography,
thinking about ‘social reproduction’ in terms of the socialisation of societies’ new members
rather thinking much either about their biological origin or about what determines their number.
For example William Goode started his study of the family with the remark that it was ‘the only
social institution charged with transforming a biological organism into a human being’ (1964:8)
while virtually ignoring the equally salient fact that families are the only institution able to
produce such ‘biological organisms’ in the first place – should they choose to do so. The
discipline has not always ignored this issue in the past. Between the two world wars birth rates
fell across the industrialised North; several states in Europe (including the UK, France,
Germany, Norway, Denmark and Sweden) experienced fertility rates below replacement level,
and demographers and sociologists such as D.V. Glass, for example, in his The Struggle for
Population (1936) surveyed pro-natalist policies, which had been adopted on a widespread, if
piecemeal, basis in order to reverse this trend. He reached a pessimistic conclusion about their
prospects for success.
A key question today is whether current low fertility in Europe is a temporary phenonmenon,
caused, amongst other factors, by leads and lags in institutions such as the family and labour
market adjusting to gender change or a chronic problem inherent in any technologically
advanced, mobile, market oriented society. As I argue below, this discussion has its roots in a
debate started in the 1930s when sociologists of the family took a keen interest in demographic
issues. Kingsley Davis (1937) (along with others such as Alva Myrdal 1941) was initially a
proponent of the second view, basing his arguments on a functionalist theory of the family and
arguing that industrial society destroyed the previous, status-based ‘familialist’ social order in
which the family was pre-eminent and reproduction central to the family. While the post world-
war two baby-boom caused him to revise his ideas in a less pessimistic direction (e.g. Blake and
Davis 1956), he returned to his earlier insistence of the significance of women’s employment
for low fertility later in life (e.g. Davis 1984). Meanwhile no less a figure than Talcott Parsons
(Parsons and Bales 1956) dismissed the apocalyptic scenario painted by Davis, and argued that
any fertility problem was temporary and stemmed from the disorder created by the transition to
modern society.
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3.- The reconciliation of work and family life
The ‘reconciliation of work and family life’, work-life ‘balance’ or ‘family friendly’
employment policies has also become a focus for both academic and policy analysis recently.
We can cite only a selection of recent official reports and academic studies in the UK, but might
observe that when the Treasury, rather than just the Department of Work and Pensions or Social
Security is getting in on the act, then we can be fairly sure that the policy interest is robust (HM
Treasury 2003, Bevan et al 1999; Deven et al 1998; Kazak 1998; McRae 2002; Fisher and
Layte 2002; Iacovou 2001; Warin et al 1999). The main reason for this is the continuous
expansion, common to all European and all OECD member countries, of women’s, especially
mothers’, employment, and the consequent transformation of female activity rates across the life
course into a distribution similar to that of men (Solsona and Treviño 1995). This expansion of
mothers’ employment has fatally eroded the male breadwinner system that previously regulated
the relation between paid work and families through a sex based division of labour between
male earners and female parents; between paid employment and unpaid family caring work,
including the reproduction of children.
For example between 1960 and 2001 the relative female activity rate (RFAR - women’s
economic activity rate expressed as a percentage of the male rate; Siaroff 1994) increased from
44% to 75% in the fifteen member countries of the European Union. Again, change has been
especially rapid in Spain, where the RFAR rose from 26% to 59% in this period, including a
rise of fifteen percentage points in the last decade (OECD 2002). In Barcelona, in only five
years from 1991 – 96, the percentage of married mothers of children under 18 who were
economically inactive ‘housewives’ fell from 47 to 33% (Brullet & Torrabodella 2002).
Table 1 shows a similar measure: the relative female employment rate (the proportion of
women aged 15 – 64 in employment expressed as a percentage of the proportion of men of the
same age in employment) for EU countries since 1960. As well as showing the dramatic
change in relative employment rates over the last forty years it suggests that members of the EU
can be grouped fairly easily into three distinct categories according to this measure. In the
Scandinavian countries (Finland, Denmark and Sweden) women’s employment is around 90%
of that of men. In the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany Austria, Portugal and France it
is around 80% while in Spain Italy and Greece it is just under 60%. Only one country does not
fit well into these three groups: Ireland has moved, in the course of the 1990s, from the third to
the second group.
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Table 1.- Relative female employment rate: EU 1960 – 2000*
Aus Bel Dk Fi Fr D H Irl I Nl P E S UK Scot
1960 na na na na na 52.2 na na 40.4 na na na na 46.7 Na
1965 na na na na 51.6 52.2 na na 36.8 na na na 58.6 50.7
1970 57.5 na na na 54.2 51.9 na 36.9 36.2 na na 30.6 66.6 54.8
1975 58.0 na na na 58.6 57.8 na 38.3 na 37.5 na 35.2 75.2 61.7
1980 59.0 54.0 na 84.6 63.1 61.5 40.6 41.7 43.7 43.9 55.9 37.0 83.8 66.1
1985 62.9 59.7 82.7 90.8 69.4 62.8 50.3 46.5 46.2 52.0 62.8 38.9 91.0 71.9 76.7
1990 68.7 66.9 86.5 91.5 72.6 67.7 53.8 54.1 51.5 62.7 68.3 44.4 94.9 76.7 81.0
1995 75.4 71.9 84.6 91.0 77.0 74.9 56.0 61.0 52.6 70.7 75.7 50.9 96.4 82.1 88.4
2000 77.1 74.4 88.8 90.7 80.5 79.0 53.8 69.3 57.6 76.6 78.8 57.7 94.9 83.1 90.6
Source: Author’s analysis based on: EU, OECD 2002; Scotland: Scottish Executive 2002 tab 4.1.
*Data for Scotland are not strictly comparable as female employment is expressed as a proportion of women aged
16-59 rather than 15-64. Other things equal this increases the relative female employment rate.
Graph 3. - Male and female employment rates S cotland: 1984- 2001
(From Scottish Economic Statistics 2002, p. 101)
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The origins of this new academic and policy interest in joining up the sociology of employment
and the family does not lie, as is frequently claimed, (e.g. Palomba 2003: 2) in new, more far-
sighted, attempts to synthesise analyses of these two social institutions which in the past were
kept separate. Both sociological and economic theory (e.g. Davis 1937, Myrdal 1946, Parsons
and Bales 1956, Becker 1960) has long attempted such an integration. What has changed is
rather that the collapse of the male breadwinner and family wage employment system has
profoundly altered the nature of the family-employment relationship. It was fairly easy to
separate out the sociologies of the family and employment in societies where only men had
careers, or were assumed to be primarily oriented to a lifetime’s participation in the labour
market, and where women’s central life interest was assumed to be parenthood, even though
they might seek employment until becoming mothers and seek to resume it some time after
this. Workers could usually be assumed to be relatively free of domestic labour commitments
(and often, until the impact upon the discipline of second wave feminism, be assumed to be
male) while parenting could be assumed to be, essentially, mothering. Thus while we have many
surveys asking respondents about their views of working mothers, only in the last two decades
or so has there been much interest in working fathers, as fathers. Indeed, some of the most
impressive social psychological theorising about parenting in Britain - attachment theory
developed inter alia by Bowlby (1973) and Winnicott (1965), could be conducted using the
terms ‘mother’ as synonymous with parent.2
4.- The sociology of the male breadwinner system and fertility
Moreover, it is often forgotten that classic sociological analysis of the rise of the male
breadwinner system was developed as an explanation for the ability of modern industrial
societies to develop a family form that would maintain replacement fertility rates. To appreciate
this it is useful to revisit the terms of this debate. In 1937 Kingsley Davis published an
iconoclastic and provocative article in Sociological Review (1937) arguing that because
industrialism (by which he meant modern, market based, urban, mobile societies) destroyed
familism (by which he meant societies based on the patriarchal authority of family heads and
household subsistence production) it also destroyed the family, and thus created an irreversible
trend decline in fertility rates:
                                                
2 Both authors however consistently pointed out that their theories were actually about parents of either sex.
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‘[within familism] Parents receive economic security from their children. They enjoy
intimacy and affection from kinsmen rather than outsiders, and from their own children
rather than those of others. They gain recognition, power and authority through offspring,
for children and grandchildren increase the strength of the family unit. Finally insofar as
people need a 'cause' to live for, they can find it in the family, its extension back in time to
ancestors and forward through progeny constituting the abstract principle around which
concrete sentiments are clustered … individuals have every reason to reproduce, maintain,
socialise and place children, because the family represents within itself an almost complete
organisation of life. One does not fit into this organisation unless one does rear children,
and if one does not fit into the family organisation one does not fit into society. … The
prime familial function being to give birth, the family is invariably strong where inherited
status is strong, and weak where individual mobility reigns. As our mobile society, with its
doctrine of equal opportunity and its adulation of the self made man, continues to nullify
the inheritance of status, it continues to kill the family … in a mobile society children are,
at any level, a hindrance to social climbing… the correlation between a high income and
low birth rate makes it obvious that simple lack of money is not the reason for
childlessness' (1937: 295, 296, 301, 305).
If the state tried to step in to subsidise the cost of parenting or provide services this would
eventually lead to the industrialisation of the family:
‘a system in which the father's role is assumed by the state and the mother's role by
professional women paid by the state for their services’ (1937:304).
In place of the centrality of sexual reproduction, the focus of the family was changing to one
of the development of intimacy and of a ‘haven in a heartless world’ (Lasch 1977). However
neither such intimacy nor sex itself was any longer confined to or regulated by the family.
Modern society facilitated ‘unconventionalised intimacies’ while marriage itself was
progressively reduced to the status of ‘an amorous adventure’. In fact, sixty years before
Giddens (1992) Davis put forward the central ideas of the transformation of intimacy, the
decline of reproductivist ideas of sex, the rise of plastic sexuality, the decline of patriarchal
authority within the family and the rise of democratised and ‘pure’ relationships. But in
contrast to Giddens, Davis foresaw two problems. If the family was no longer powerful, and
sexual reproduction no longer its focus, then fertility must fall: nor was there any obvious
reason for it to stop falling. And if family relations increasingly came to resemble other more
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public social relations, what would happen to intimacy, attachment and the role of the family as
a ‘haven’ from heartlessness. What would a world with no heart be like? Davis abandoned
these themes in the face of the post-war baby boom, and the 1956 article written with Blake is,
amongst other things, an attempt to explain why fertility might be just as high in industrial
socieites as in more traditional ones. However when the boom turned to slump in the 1980s,
Davis returned to his earlier argument:
The fundamental principle of the family is ascription of status. ... The principle of
industrial society is the opposite. By rewarding people for achievement, for what
they do rather than who they are, industrialism generates competition and mobility.
... Replacement of population however - at least insofar as it depends on biological
motives - has not been “industrialized”. It has been left to the family ... In a sense,
then, industrial societies have left the important function of population replacement
to a unit that is not only alien in principle to industrialism but which is vestigial, a
social fossil. ... But of late the encroachments of modernity have so demoralized
the family that it is failing to fulfil its reproductive function. (1987: 59-60)
Davis’ arguments can also be seen as the origin of Parsons’ theory of the family, which came to
have a great impact on sociology in the post-war period. Although Parsons hardly ever mentions
Davis by name, the language he uses make it clear that he had what he saw as Davis’s theories
of ‘race suicide’ in his sights. The key thing, argued Parsons, was the sexual division of labour
between a breadwinner husband, who maintained the family in material terms, and a carer wife,
who specialised in its emotional health and the care of its members. The Oedipus complex,
borrowed directly from Freud, was taken as the model both of socialisation into and
reproduction of this sexual division of labour, and the key role of the family became ‘the
stabilisation of adult personality’. Moreover, in Parsons’ theory this gender based division of
identity itself supported fertility levels. The family changed its form rather than being destroyed.
‘The two generations are, by virtue of the isolation of the nuclear family, thrown more
closely on each other. ... By and large a “good” marriage from the point of view of the
personality of the participants, is likely to be one with children; the functions as parents
reinforce the functions in relation to each other as spouses. ... Put very schematically, a
mature women can love, sexually, only a man who takes his full place in the masculine
world, above all its occupational aspect, and who takes responsibility for a family;
conversely, the mature man can only love a woman who is really an adult, a full wife to
him and mother to his children... Indeed we argue that probably the importance of the
family and its functions for society constitutes the primary set of reasons why there is a
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social as distinguished from purely reproductive, differentiation of sex roles. ... the recent
change in the American family itself and in its relation to the rest of society ... is far from
implying an erasure of the differentiation of sex roles; in many respects it reinforces and
clarifies it.’ (1956:23, 20 - 22)
But what would happen if the male breadwinner system was to change: for example as a result
of rising women’s employment: a phenomenon well known to Parsons? At first he sought to
minimise its importance. In 1942 he wrote:
‘The majority of “ career”  women whose occupational status is comparable with that of
men in their own class, at least in the upper middle and upper classes, are unmarried, and in
the small proportion of cases where they are married the result is a profound alteration in
family structure … only a very small fraction have gone very far in this direction. It is also
clear that its generalization would only be possible with profound alterations in the structure
of the family,’ (1942:94, 96)
But by the end of the 1950s it was obvious that in the USA at least, women’s employment was
indeed reaching a scale at which some profound alteration in family structure must take place.
Parsons reaction to this development is (in a negative sense) profoundly illuminating. In
outright contradiction to the entire thrust of his earlier writing, and offering no new empirical
evidence or analytical argument, he suggested that the collapse of the breadwinner system need
have no significant effect:
‘it is interesting, and in line with our general view, that this process of the reinforcement
of the nuclear family has coincided with a very large increase in the participation of
married women in the labour force’ (1961: 213-4, my emphasis, JM).
Given this analytical lacuna it is not surprising that the issue of fertility faded from view in the
sociology of the family, in both its traditional and radical versions, because in the absence of a
male breadwinner system, it was not at all clear that the sociology of the family had any
explanation for reproduction at all.
5.- The collapse of the male breadwinner system
The male breadwinner system has been eroded by four interrelated developments, all of which
ultimately have their roots in the way liberalism undermines patriarchy (Mann 1994, MacInnes
1998). First, there has been the consolidation of increasingly equal opportunities
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(‘credentialism’ and gender meritocracy in both education and training for and recruitment to
employment) together with the rise of the service sector (‘de-industrialisation’) and the
consequent ‘feminisation of employment’.
Second, dramatic generational changes in attitudes about gender roles have occurred. For
example, while in 1988 a majority of adults in Spain agreed with the central tenet of male
breadwinner ideology that ‘A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the
house and family’ by 2002 less than one in six agreed with this idea, and 71% described their
ideal family as one where ‘both the man and woman are employed and share household chores
and childcare’ (CIS 2448). This is a good description of the ‘dual earner dual carer’ model of
production and reproduction suggested by both Fraser (1994) and Folbre (1994). Comparable
data for Europe will become available from the ISSP survey Family and Gender Roles III
fielded in 2002, but we already have UK data for 1980 to 1999 (for women only) from a survey
by McRae (2002) which shows a similar change in attitudes. Since the views of men and
women on this issue rarely diverged substantially in Europe in 1994 (when Family and Gender
Roles II was fielded) it is likely that the dimensions of attitudinal change found in Spain will
have been repeated elsewhere. We know, of course, that behaviour lags some way behind
attitudes (Anderson et al 1994, Gershuny et al 1997, Valiente 1997 Vila 1999). Employers’
development of ‘family friendly’ policies in response to the feminisation of employment has
been limited by competitive pressure, despite public and government encouragement, while
evidence on change in the division of domestic labour and childcare suggests that the decline of
gender inequality in practice is much slower than changes in public norms.
Third, governments’ commitment to gender equality as represented in equal opportunities
legislation and subscription to international conventions has as often as not taken them from
soaring rhetoric to implementing practical measures that have led to real progress. For example
article 11(2)b of the 1981 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women committed governments:
‘To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable
parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in
public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a
network of child-care facilities.’ (UN 1981)
The European Union’s Equality Strategy, includes in its objectives the ‘modification of sex
roles and stereotypes’ and measures to ‘improve the reconciliation of work and family life so
that men as well as women find it easier to re-enter the labour market after an absence’. The
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existence of these kinds of promises makes it easier to persuade states to take action on gender
inequality, as well as reinforcing the general legitimacy of gender equality. As Connell (1995)
has noted, patriarchy faces a legitimation crisis.
Finally, states have developed increased direct and indirect state support for childcare through
the provision of income transfers, maternity and parental leave, childcare, health and education
services, which benefits mothers insofar as they have historically undertaken the majority of this
work. As well as socialising part of the cost of rearing children, such transfers (in combination
with greater labour market gender equality) permit a greater flexibility of family form and in
particular facilitate single parent families, and free mothers from automatic dependence on an
earner patriarch. Castles (2001) shows that, contrary to expectations, neo-liberalism and
globalisation have not decreased such state expenditure. However it varies widely across
different states. If we look only at social expenditure which excludes education, the percentage
of this destined to support for families with children varied from a high of 17% in Sweden to a
mere 2% in Spain. However, as I argue below, the law of declining relative labour productivity in
services identified by Baumol (1967) implies that the share of such expenditure in national
income must progressively increase to continue to provide a similar level of service: maintaining
expenditure, even in ‘real’ terms, may actually represent reductions in provision.
It is worth considering why it is that despite the interest in ‘reconciliation of work and family
life’ ‘work-life balance’ or ‘family friendly’ employment, there is a notable lack of analytical
precision, and remarkable absence of the development of any indicators which would allow us
to measure or compare the degree of ‘reconciliation’, ‘balance’ or ‘family friendliness’
inherent in any given employment relationship or family organisation. The lack of such
indicators not only results in analytical confusion and imprecision, but makes it difficult to
identify factors which frustrate or facilitate ‘balance’ or reconciliation, including the issue of
parenting. The reason for this is that ‘reconciliation’ as such, is not the important issue, nor is it
a new one. The male breadwinner system, as Parsons and others showed, did an effective job of
reconciling work and family life, however it did so at the cost, inter alia, of systematic sexual
inequality. What is new, and needs to be adequately thought through, is how such reconciliation
might take place in gender egalitarian terms, and thus what the essence of ‘reconciliation’ or
‘balance’ comprises, or the forms that the family is to take, to which policies might be
‘friendly’.
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6.- Reflexivity and parental identity
Contemporary, late modern, society has been argued by commentators such as Giddens (1991,
1992), Castells (1996, 1997) and Beck and Beck Gernsheim (1995) to be witnessing a decline
in the significance of socially, normatively defined, status and a rise in the importance of
autonomously and reflexively defined self-identity. We can trace the roots of this change to
three related and irreversible developments: (1) the rise of formal equality (the franchise, legal
equality, the discourse of human rights, equal opportunities legislation), (2) the incessantly
mobile nature of modern society (Gellner’s ‘culture become structure’) and (3) the continuing
‘globalisation’ of the economy, culture and communications. These authors all argue that within
the material and ideological constraints that they face, men and women increasingly seek to
develop and realise personal life projects over which they seek autonomy and control. Giddens
(1992) and others have argued that both sexual activity and the formation of sexual unions
(whether or not involving marriage) have become increasingly divorced from the purposes of
reproduction, leading to what he calls ‘plastic sex’ and ‘pure relationships’.
Works by US authors such as Dealey (1912), Davis (1937) and Wirth (1938) can be seen as
earlier and prescient formulations of such ideas. Dealey described the family as coming to
resemble ‘a temporary meeting place for board and lodging’ (192, 90-91). Davis argued that
modernity facilitated 'unconventionalised intimacies' and that contemporary marriage was like
'entering upon an amorous adventure' (1937:296, 297). Because child rearing was no longer
central to the family, Davis speculated, provocatively, whether the ‘industrialisation’ of the
family might be in prospect, as a logical extension of increased state involvement in, and
responsibility for, reproduction: ‘a system in which the father’s role is assumed by the state and
the mother’s role by professional women paid by the state for their services’ (1937:304). Wirth
suggested that ‘urbanism’ created a rise in individual autonomy and freedom to pursue
‘divergent interests’ that extended to relations within the family.
It is thus easy to overstate the nature of changes that Giddens, Castells and Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim all posit. The fact that other commentators such as Wirth could anticipate their
arguments, if not their terminology, by over half a century suggests that change has been less
rapid than they imagine. It is also important not to confuse the imagination of autonomous life
projects, identity and reflexivity, or the discussion of the life course or biography in these terms
with the actual realisation of a self-defined life project and identity as Craib (1994, 1998)
argues.3 However, as Weeks (1995) suggests, it seems fairly clear that the authority of tradition
has been greatly undermined by the ideology of self-determination: that even those who appeal
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to the scriptures or nature to make sense of their values or to justify them, do so in the
knowledge that ‘they have no choice but to choose’.
While much attention has been given to aspects of this process such as gender identity and the
crisis of masculinity (Bourdieu 2000; MacInnes 1998) or national identity (Anderson 1991,
Billig 1995, Cohen 1996) and theorists of the second demographic transition have used such
ideas to account for change in family formation and dissolution referred to briefly above, taking
them fully into account makes some older sociological schema of the determinants of fertility
behaviour rather redundant.
In a classic article Blake and Davis (1956) outlined 11 ‘intervening variables between ‘natural
fertility’ – the rate of fertility that might exist were there no social regulation – and achieved
fertility. They divided these variables into factors that (1) determined exposure to coitus (2)
determined the risk of conception from coitus and (3) determined the success of the pregnancy.
For example the first set of factors concerned norms and institutions that affected the formation
and dissolution of sexual unions (principally marriage) and the frequency of coitus within them,
while the second set concerned knowledge and use of contraception, and the incidence of
voluntary (planned) or involuntary sterility. This schema, and its various refinements, was
employed widely and productively in both the historical study of fertility patterns and analysis
of developing countries, where, to take one example, the emphasis on the length and nature of
legitimated sexual unions, was clearly central to understanding fertility change. However it
offers little purchase, as Chesnais’ comment cited above implies, on what is happening in
contemporary Europe, where knowledge and use of a range of contraception techniques is
widespread and the concept of sexual union probably less important than the nature of that
sexual union (is it centred for example on ‘plastic’ or ‘reproductive’ sex). The range of
intervening variables described by Davis and Blake is now more likely to be determined by
behaviour that is consciously followed by adults with the potential fertility consequences of their
actions very much in mind. Rather than intervening ‘independent’ variables they might better be
considered as variables that have become dependent on a prior variable of desires and practices
relevant to fertility formulated in the context of developing various life projects. In this context
Lesthaegue’s argument that demography must understand “ the ever more important role of the
pursuit of individual goals, that is, the right and liberty of the individual to define his own ends
and the means to attain them’4 (1983, p. 429) is especially relevant. For example, demography
                                                                                                                                                    
3 I use the term ‘imagination’ in the sense employed by Anderson (1992).
4 My translation of ‘el papel cada vez más preponderante del logro de las metas individuales, es decir, el
derecho y la libertad del individuo a definir sus metas y los medios para aleanzarlas”
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has often been concerned, for good reasons, with marriage rates, given the importance of
legitimate sexual unions in determining the status of children, so that Malinowski (1927) could
confidently state that in the entire anthropological literature there was ‘… no single instance …
of a community where illegitimate children … enjoy the same social treatment and have the
same social status as legitimate ones’. This clearly no longer holds when one in four births in
the European Union are to parents who are unmarried, and as a consequence, the contrast in the
status of cohabitation and marriage becomes less salient.
The fact that, on the one hand, it is becoming more common to try to understand social
behaviour in terms of identities, and that on the other fertility behaviour seems increasingly to be
a form of behaviour influenced by ‘life project’ factors, suggests that it makes sense to explore
the concept of parental identity. Moreover survey evidence suggests that it may be a central but
under-theorised and under-researched aspect of contemporary ‘reflexive’ identities. Given a
range of different dimensions of identity and asked to prioritise them respondents in both
Scotland (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2001) and Catalonia (Castells & Tubella 2002)
chose responses bound up with the ‘family’ as tables 2 and 3 show. The Scottish study, which
disaggregated responses more finely, showed that within the family it was parental status that
was most often cited. Moreover, these tables understate the importance of parental identity as
they include responses from non-parents who are hardly likely to cite parenthood as an
important way in which they think of themselves. If we look only at parents its significance
increases still further. Table 4 suggests that parental identity is particularly salient for prime age
women, and that for men of this age group it overtakes (just) the competing dimensions of
economic status and national identity.
Table 2.- With what do you most identify?
With my family 56.0
With myself 8.7
I don’t feel identified with anything in particular 5.4
With my work 5.1
With people my age 4.9
With my culture 4.7
With humanity as a whole 3.2
With being a man/woman 3.0
With my country 2.5
With my religion 2.5
With nature 2.3
With my language 1.7
N
3005
Source: Castells and Tuebba (2002).
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Table 3 Respondents’ first and second choice of ‘identities’, grouped5.
First choice Second choice
A mother / A father/wife/husband 29.5 ) 29.4 )
A woman / A man 9.5 ) 39.0 8.0 ) 37.4
A working person/retired/unemployed 13.3 ) 14.2 )
Working class/middle class 9.5 ) 22.8 9.3 ) 23.5
Scottish/British 21.1 16.5
Young/Elderly 5.1 4.8
Protestant/Catholic/(Not) religious 4.6 7.8
A country/city person 3.9 5.1
Black/White/Asian .8 1.4
Other / None/ DK 2.7 3.4
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2001, author’s analysis
To argue that parental identity might be a useful analytical concept says nothing about the
content of that identity however, or for example, whether there are imagined to be differences
between father- and mother-hood. What we might think of today as ‘parental identity’ would
have been of fundamental importance in a patriarchal social order where the status of biological
fatherhood bestowed a range of powers – especially over the disposal of the labour of wives and
children. However it is perhaps significant that the Scottish survey showed mothers to be twice
as likely as fathers to prioritise their parental identity (49% versus 24%) and less than half as
likely as husbands to cite their spousal one (4% versus 11%). Whatever values and ideas
parental identity might currently embrace, a revival of the patria potestes does not seem to be
one of them.
                                                
5 Respondents were asked:
‘Some people say that whether they feel British or Scottish is not as important as other things
about them. Other people say their national identity is the key to who they are.
If you had to pick just one thing from this list to describe yourself - something that is very
important to you when you think of yourself, what would it be? … And what would the second
most important thing be?’
Comparison with the Catalan results suggests that the introduction may have encouraged respondents to think
in terms of national identity.
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Table 4.- Identity priorities, Scotland, 2001 by sex and age
Age Group
1. MALES 18 – 29 30 – 54 55-65 65+
Family and gender 15 33 25 19
Of which fatherhood 4 21 12 11
economic status 24 25 33 38
nationality 34 32 33 23
Age, life course 13 1 1 8
Religion 8 7 2 6
Location 2 3 6 6
Race, ethnicity 5 *
(n) 139 310 105 134
Females
Family and gender 39 65 51 31
Of which motherhood 20 42 29 19
economic status 14 15 25 31
nationality 22 13 13 15
Age, life course 16 1 2 10
Religion 3 2 3 7
Location 3 3 7 5
Race, ethnicity 3 1 1
(n) 160 432 121 204
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2001, author’s analysis
The concept of parental identity could be useful, not to define what it is to be a parent, or what all
parental ‘life projects’ entail, but rather to capture what those who are or aspire to be parents (or
indeed those who wish to avoid that status) imagine it means and the consequences which they
perceive to flow from that. It will thus probably be both diverse across generations, class, race or
sex and dynamic over the life course. It will include some vision of the obligations due to
children, in terms both of emotional attachment and material provision and support. It will
include some negotiation between individual parental ideals and the constraints of social
structure and material resources in terms of time, income, availability of support (whether from
family, friends the local or national state, actual or potential employers), the legal framework
(such as family and inheritance law), child friendliness - or otherwise - of the material and
ideological environment (a concept well grasped by Myrdal in her 1941 discussion of the
relative social ‘cumbersomeness’ of children in different societies), and finally the alternative
life chances foregone that time devoted to children entails.
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Since parenthood and childhood are virtually fused, changing discourses about childhood (Aries
1987, UN 1990) are fundamental to definitions of parental identity, especially insofar as they
impact upon the emotional intensity of the parental role and its costs in terms of time, money
and alternative opportunities foregone. The related reversal in the net flow of the
intergenerational transfer of wealth (Caldwell 1976) and change in its organisation across the
life course also has implications for parental roles, however these are subjects for another paper.
Similarly parental identity will also be influenced by the evolution and increasing diversity of
family forms cited above.
Finally parental identity also embraces various ‘spiritual’ dimensions in the sense of providing
an increasingly ‘missing’ link between fatality and continuity in modern socieites. Anderson
(1991) has argued that disenchanted societies have a conceptualisation of themselves as
structures which are rationally understandable - in priniciple if not always in practice - and
which move progressively (in all senses) through ‘homogeneuos empty time’ according to a
logic of cause and effect.6 In fact it could be argued that Anderson’s theory actually suggests
that it is only modern societies that imagine themselves to be societies at all, at least in any sense
in which sociology would recognise the term. This conceptualisation, argues Anderson,
marginalizes compassion for suffering or transcendental understandings of the world, whereas
the power of world religions had always been their ability to address suffering by transforming
fatality into continuity. This is an issue recognised, albeit rather weakly, by Giddens when he
notes the importance of ‘ontological insecurity’ in late modern societies). One might say that
one step beyond the ‘unprecedented inner loneliness’ of Weber’s Calvinist lies the spiritual
desolation of a thoroughly disenchanted rationalism which at first glance appears to squeeze out
any space for mystery, faith, teleology or compassion. As Gellner used to emphasise, modernity
is a heartless space.
Anderson’s purpose in making this point was to argue that ‘national’ forms of imagining arise,
in part, to fill this gap and provide a link between fatality and continuity. Whether or not his
argument is valid, it is by no means clear that national identity is the only way that such links
might be sought, and it is instructive that Anderson himself turns to parenthood when he
searches for an illustration of his argument, which is worth quoting at some length.
If the manner of a man’s dying usually seems arbitrary, his mortality is inescapable.
Human lives are full of such combinations of necessity and chance. … The great
                                                
6 Gellner (1983) makes a similar argument, focusing on the philosophy of causation rather than time.
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merit of traditional religious world-views (which naturally must be distinguished from
their role in the legitimation of specific systems of domination and exploitation) has
been their concern with man-in-the-cosmos, man as species being, and the
contingency of life. … their imaginative response to the overwhelming burden of
human suffering-disease, mutilation, grief, age, and death. … The great weakness of
all evolutionary/progressive styles of thought, not excluding Marxism, is that such
questions are answered with impatient silence. At the same time, in different ways,
religious thought also responds to obscure intimations of immortality, generally by
transforming fatality into continuity (karma, original sin, etc.) In this way, it concerns
itself with the links between the dead and the yet unborn, the mystery of re-generation.
Who experiences their child’s conception and birth without dimly apprehending a
combined connectedness, fortuity, and fatality in a language of ‘continuity’? (1991,
10 – 11, my emphasis)
Is not one aspect of parenthood the ‘imagined community’, not horizontally, of nations, but
vertically, of descendents, including those ‘yet unborn’? Is the prioritisation of an infant’s
interests over that of its parents (biological or social) not a powerful demonstration of ‘deep
comradeship’ that is vertical rather than horizontal in form and is fundamentally about
‘sacrifice?’ What else does ‘attachment’ (Bowlby 1973, Winnicott 1965) comprise than a
comradeship almost without limit? Does the significance of this sacrifice not grow in a society
where, by definition, the essence of the parent-infant relationship is that no obligation can be
placed on the latter other than that which promotes the child’s own interests, which countless
conventions, treaties, legal rulings and so forth declare must be paramount? It would be just as
wrong to overstate changes in social understandings of childhood as it would be to ignore them.
Van de Kaa (1997) has pointed out that the net cost of the youngest children has always been
positive, while all manner of exploitation and abuse reminds us that the ‘rights’ that are
proclaimed for children (United Nations 1989) may be honoured more in the breach than the
observance. I simply want to suggest here that using the tools of analysis associated with
identities and their evolution may prove fruitful in the field of analysing both the behaviour and
attitudes of parents and of those thinking about becoming parents. As such it may in particular
prove to be a useful addition to more traditional ways of understanding used in demography to
think about the determinants of fertility. It might go some way to filling the analytical gap
identified by Chesnais. However, in doing so it will be important to conceptualise identities
carefully, in particular differentiating between parental self images, ideologies of ‘responsible’
parenthood and individual and social aspirations about parenting.
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7.- Social attitudes towards family forms, mother’s employment and fertility plans in
contemporary Europe
A first step towards grasping the contours of parental identity in contemporary Europe is to
review some survey evidence about adults’ views on the nature of parenting and its
relationship to other individual and family aspirations or obligations such as earning money.
Comparative information about attitudes towards marriage, the family, children, parenting and
gender roles is available from the ISSP European wide survey ‘Family and Gender Roles ’
fielded in 1988 and 1994 and repeated again in 2002 (data from the latest round has yet to be
made available). Because most of the questions asked were general ones, they are a more
reliable guide to what people imagine the social norms to be that surround these issues
contextualising, rather than directly regulating, their behaviour. In the tables that follow the
results of the ISSP survey from participating Western European countries has been analysed
with responses weighted by the adult population of the respondent’s country in 1994. The
survey covered adults in the UK (including Northern Ireland), the Republic of Ireland, the
unified Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Norway. All the results
discussed below are statistically significant at the 1% level, but it should be borne in mind that
the size of the sample (almost 16000) respondents, means that quite weak relationships reach
levels of significance.
There is substantial tolerance across Europe for the idea of cohabitation. Almost two thirds of
respondents thought that ‘it is alright for a couple to live together without intending to get
married’, and while there was also substantial support for the idea that those wanting children
should get married (just over a half (57%) thought so), this did not imply rejection of the idea
that single parents could bring up children just as well as couples: almost two fifths (38%)
agreed that ‘one parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together.. There was little
support for the idea that the main purpose of marriage should be to produce children (only
just over a quarter of respondents thought so) and very little support for the concept of
marriage as an end in itself. The idea, for example, that a ‘bad’ marriage is better than no
marriage at all, was supported by only one in twenty respondents. Nor was there much
resistance to ending a problem marriage when there are children present: only a quarter
thought that ‘parents should stay together even if they don’t get along’, compared to 8% who
resisted separation when there were no children present. These results suggest that there is no
longer any question of ‘not fitting into society’ as Davis put it, if one does not marry. Nor
was marriage seen as conferring either greater happiness - only a third agreed with this
proposition or that its main advantage was to gain economic security: again only around a
third agreed.
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There was still great belief in the abstract desirability of children: nine out of ten people agreed
that ‘watching children grow up is one of life’s greatest joys’, however only two fifths agreed
that such fulfilment was fundamental to any life project by agreeing that ‘people who have
never had children lead empty lives’. There was also strong support for the principle of
children’s self expression: over 70% thought that it was more important for children to ‘think
for themselves’ rather than ‘be obedient’ when preparing them for life. But just over a quarter
of respondents thought that ‘having children interferes too much with the freedom of
parents’. Table 5 shows these results, according to the age of respondent (differences by sex
were almost always negligible).
‘Male breadwinner’ norms now command little support. Under one third agreed that it is ‘a
man’s job is to earn money, a woman’s job is to look after the home and family’ and a
slightly greater proportion thought that ‘what most women really want is a home and
children’. Such low support was related both to the recognition that families need two
incomes and to the belief that employment is a key component of women’s independence.
Over seven out of ten thought that ‘most women have to work these days to support their
families’, that ‘both the man and woman should contribute to household income’ and that
‘having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person’. It was also related to
confidence that employment and motherhood is not necessarily contradictory: two thirds
thought that ‘a working mother can establish just as warm a relationship with her children’ as
other mothers. However there was still concern about the employment of mothers of young,
pre-school children. Just over a half of respondents thought that ‘a pre-school child is likely
to suffer if his or her mother works’ and a similar proportion thought that mothers in this
situation should stay at home. However around two-fifths thought that such mothers should
work part-time. Just over half thought that ‘family life suffers’ when women have a full time
job, but just under two thirds also agreed that family life suffers ‘because men concentrate too
much on their work’. Table 6 shows the main results. (Unfortunately no other questions were
asked about attitudes towards working fathers).
While such views confirm that the normative order portrayed by Davis as ‘familism’ no
longer exists in Europe, they are hardly consistent with the kind of attitudes we might expect
had the ‘industrialisation’ of the family he feared developed very far. They also suggest that
the ideology of the male breadwinner system set out by Parsons has only limited and
declining support. As we shall see it has been weakened by the experience of women’s
employment and the increasing gender egalitarianism of younger generations. Thus increasing
women’s employment has been associated with changes in gender attitudes too.
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Table 5.- Views on marriage and the family: Europe 1994 by age group
Age Group
% agreeing with the following statements…* Under 30 30s &
40s
50+ All (n)
It is alright for a couple to live together without
intending to get married.
8 1 . 1 7 6 . 9 4 6 . 1 6 6 . 4 15454
It's a good idea for a couple who intend to get
married to live together-first.
7 3 . 3 6 6 . 2 4 8 . 0 6 1 . 0 15358
People who want children ought to get married. 3 8 . 3 4 6 . 6 7 8 . 2 5 6 . 7 15587
The main purpose of marriage these days is to
have children.
1 7 . 1 2 2 . 3 3 7 . 7 2 6 . 9 15424
It is better to have a bad marriage than no
marriage at all.
3 . 0 3 . 3 7 . 5 4 . 8 15514
Married people are generally happier 1 7 . 0 2 6 . 0 4 8 . 1 3 2 . 2 14644
The main advantage of marriage is that it gives
financial security.
1 8 . 0 2 1 . 8 4 2 . 0 2 8 . 6 15422
One parent can bring up a child as well as two
parents together.
4 0 . 5 4 0 . 4 3 3 . 6 3 7 . 9 15348
Divorce is usually the best solution when a
couple can't seem to work out their marriage.
5 9 . 9 6 8 . 0 7 1 . 9 6 7 . 6 15144
When there are children in the family, parents
should stay together even if they don't get along.
1 6 . 3 2 0 . 1 3 8 . 9 2 6 . 3 15109
Even when there are no children, a married couple
should stay together even if they don't get along.
5 . 7 5 . 6 1 2 . 2 8 . 1 15264
Watching children grow up is life's greatest joy. 8 3 . 8 8 6 . 7 9 2 . 9 8 8 . 5 15218
People who have never had children lead empty
lives.
2 7 . 9 3 4 . 9 5 1 . 2 3 9 . 6 14722
Having children interferes too much with the
freedom of parents.
2 9 . 8 2 7 . 3 2 6 . 5 2 7 . 6 15490
*Note respondents who said that they neither agreed nor disagreed are included in the base upon which these
percentages are calculated.
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Table 6.- Views on women and employment: Europe 1994 by age group








A man's job is to earn money; a
woman's job is to look after the home
and family.
1 4 . 7 2 1 . 2 4 9 . 0 3 0 . 2 15730
A job is alright-but what most women
really want is a home and children.
2 7 . 2 2 9 . 4 5 1 . 3 3 7 . 2 15163
Most women have to work these days to
support their families.
6 6 . 9 7 1 . 6 7 2 . 9 7 1 . 0 15493
Having a job is the best way for a
woman to be an independent person.
6 9 . 4 6 8 . 4 7 1 . 4 6 9 . 8 15473
A working mother can establish just as
warm and secure a relationship with her
children as a mother who does not work
7 2 . 4 7 0 . 2 6 2 . 3 6 7 . 7 15647
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if
his or her mother works.
4 9 . 0 4 9 . 1 6 6 . 9 5 5 . 8 15517
All in all, family life suffers when the
woman has a full-time job.
3 7 . 3 4 8 . 0 6 4 . 4 5 1 . 7 15528
Family life often suffers because men
concentrate too much on their work.
5 8 . 4 6 3 . 3 6 6 . 5 6 3 . 3 15270
*Note respondents who said that they neither agreed nor disagreed are included in the base upon which these
percentages are calculated.
There is little difference between the views of men and women, but age has a substantial
impact. Although this evidence is cross sectional, we can look at changing attitudes across
generations, although we have to bear in mind that attitudes may also change with age across
the life course. This revealed lower levels of support for the centrality of marriage as an
institution, and in particular as an institution vital for the reproduction of children, amongst
younger respondents. If we compare the views of respondents in their teens and twenties) with
those in their fifties and above (so that we are comparing, roughly, respondents before and
after family formation) we find that the younger respondents are much less positive about
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marriage and overwhelmingly reject male breadwinner norms. Twice as many younger
respondents are tolerant of cohabitation, (81% compared to 46%), they are much less likely to
believe that married people are happier, and very few, around 17%, think that the purpose of
marriage is to have children. Half as many as in the older group think that people who want
children should get married (38% compared to 78%). However they are more confident of the
ability of women to combine parenthood and employment. While almost two thirds (64%) of
the older group thought that family life suffers when the woman has a full time job, just over
one third of the younger group agreed (37%). They were also less likely to think that pre-
school children of working mothers were disadvantaged or that mothers ought to stay at home
when such children were present. While they were more likely to think that children should
think for themselves, they were no less likely than older respondents to think that children
were a joy, that those without children led empty lives, or that children were too burdensome.
Table 7.- Views on marriage, women’s employment and the family: Europe 1994 by type
of welfare regime
Type of Welfare Regime








A l l (n)
The main purpose of
marriage these days is to
have children.
3 7 . 8 2 3 . 3 1 7 . 5 1 7 . 5 2 7 .
3
14507
A man's job is to earn
money; a woman's job is
to look after the home and
family.
3 4 . 9 3 4 . 7 2 4 . 2 1 2 . 8 3 1 .
4
14792
All in all, family life
suffers when the woman
has a full-time job.
6 2 . 3 5 7 . 9 3 3 . 5 3 3 . 4 5 3 .
1
14592
A pre-school child is
likely to suffer if his or
her mother works.
6 2 . 6 6 6 . 0 3 9 . 1 3 1 . 9 5 7 .
3
14596
People who have never had
children lead empty lives.
4 7 . 4 4 2 . 2 1 8 . 9 2 0 . 0 3 7 .
8
13859
Watching children grow up
is life's greatest joy.




too much with the freedom
of parents.
4 1 . 7 2 7 . 7 1 0 . 3 6 . 2 2 8 .
2
14560
*Note respondents who said that they neither agreed nor disagreed are included in the base upon which these
percentages are calculated.
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We might also expect views to change according to which welfare regime respondents live
under. Following Esping-Andersen (1990), we can group countries into three groups: Social
Democratic or Scandinavian (Norway and Sweden) Liberal (Great Britain and Northern
Ireland) and Continental (W. Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain and Italy).
Sometimes it is useful to distinguish the last two states, in which case I refer to them as
Continental (South) There is little difference in views about marriage across different types of
welfare regime, although in the Continental regimes, especially the Southern Continental, there
is greater support for the idea that the main purpose of marriage is to have children.
However we do find more variation across types of welfare regime over views of male
breadwinner norms. As we might expect such norms are more strongly supported in the
Continental regimes (35% agreeing) than in either the Scandinavian (13%) or Liberal (24%)
ones. We also find less belief in the ability to reconcile employment and motherhood.
Respondents in Continental states are much more likely than their counterparts in Liberal or
Scandinavian ones to think that family life generally, or more particularly pre-school children
are likely to be harmed by mother’s employment. We also find that views on children vary:
respondents in Continental regimes are more likely to endorse the view that children are central
to a fulfilling life, and that watching them grow is a ‘joy’, but they are also much more likely to
think that having them ‘interferes too much with the freedom of parents: a view endorsed by
only 6% of respondents in Scandinavian regimes, 10% in the liberal UK, 28% in the
Continental regimes and no less than 42% of respondents in the Southern Continental regimes
of Spain and Italy. This paradox is partly explained by the point made by Esping-Andersen
(1998): ‘familialist’ continental regimes actually do least to support the child producing family:
on the contrary, they expect the family to assume the burden of child care costs that are to a
degree collectivised by the state in Scandinavian systems, or eased by the ability to buy in
household services in the Liberal system.
8.- Views on women’s employment and marriage and their relationship to fertility
What relationship, if any, does this pattern of social attitudes have on respondents’ views
about fertility and their preferred number of children? Since children are not a ‘commodity’
that people simply desire more or less of (Blake 1968) adults’ ideas about ideal numbers of
children ought to be treated as an ordinal rather than interval variable. Negligible numbers
(<1%) admit to wanting no children and few say they want only one, since it is often believed,
for various reasons, that an only child has a less positive experience than those with siblings.
As table 8 shows, two children is overwhelmingly the modal preference across Europe. The
table shows the distribution and mean ‘ideal’ number of children preferred in each country,
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together with the actual TFR 1994. In every country the ideal number of children is above the
number actually born, so that while preferences are above the replacement rate of fertility
(approximately 2.1) the TFR is substantially below it, especially in Spain and Italy. As
Chesnais (1998) argues there is a substantial amount of ‘latent’ fertility, but contrary to his
argument that Scandinavian countries have been more successful in filling this gap, it is not
clear from Table 8 (or Graph 1) that this is in fact the case. What the table does confirm is that
across Europe, if adults had actually had the number of children they said they would ideally
like, then every country would enjoy replacement levels of fertility.
Table 8.- Mean and modal ideal number of children and total fertility rate: Europe, 1994
Spain
(ex cat)
Catalonia Austria Germany Italy UK (incNI) Sweden Nether
lands
Norway Ireland All
Mean ideal no. of
children
2.41 2.26 2.19 2.19 2.27 2.29 2.45 2.60 2.62 3.12 2.30
TFR 1.21 1.44 1.22 1.74 1.88 1.57 1.86 1.86
Absolute difference 1.20 0.75 1.05 0.55 0.57 1.03 0.76 1.26
Relative difference 99.2 52.1 86.1 31.6 30.3 65.6 40.9 67.7
% adults with
preference for:
None or one child 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 4.7 2.4 .7 4.2 .9 1.1 4.9
Two children 59.7 71.6 71.3 71.2 67.8 74.0 63.7 53.4 48.2 31.4 67.6
Three + children 34.3 22.4 22.7 21.9 27.5 23.6 35.7 42.5 50.9 67.6 27.5
(n) 1807 352 453 4631 3331 3035 443 909 226 185 15372
We know, however, that preferred number of children is a function of generation amongst
other things, so that it makes little sense to discuss potential future trends in fertility behaviour
in terms of the views of those who have already ‘completed’ their fertility behaviour or are
close to doing so. Table 9 thus shows similar data to Table 8 for those respondents who were
under 46: again replacement level fertility is – theoretically – desired.
This raises the questions of what factors lie behind variations in ideal and actual family sizes,
and the difference between them. If we look at the patterns revealed by the ISSP study, we
find that many of the factors which have been the subject of extensive debates in demography
have surprisingly little impact. Religion has no substantial effect, nor does gender, income
(whether or not controlled for age), the domestic division of labour, educational qualifications,
subjective social class or the ‘welfare regime’ of the respondent’s government. Age has an
effect, but this is almost certainly a generational rather than life course one, reflecting the
progressive decline of preferred family size in Europe over the last three decades.









Mean ideal no. of
children
2.31 3.12 2.12 2.16 2.21 2.32 2.44 2.51 2.59 2.95 2.26
% with preference
for:
None or one child 7.6 6.2 7.8 8.3 6.2 2.4 .8 5.2 .7 1.0 5.9
Two children 63.9 75.4 75.0 71.8 68.7 72.3 63.2 55.7 50.0 37.8 68.4
Three + children 28.5 18.5 17.2 19.9 25.1 25.3 36.0 39.1 49.3 61.2 25.7
(n) 992 195 256 2503 1930 1667 253 540 150 98 8584
However attitudes associated with alternative visions of a ‘life project’ do have some effect.
Those who hold ‘reproductivist’ rather than ‘pure relationship’ views of sex and marriage
tend to favour larger families. For example those who think that cohabitation is a bad idea,
who think that adultery is wrong or that sex before marriage, or by teenagers or people of the
same sex is wrong; those who think that the main purpose of marriage is to have children, that
people who want to have children should get married or who think that married couples
(especially those who are parents) should never divorce and those who oppose abortion are all
slightly more likely to cite preferences for more than two children. Similarly, the 26% of
respondents who thought that children should be brought up to obey their parents rather than
think for themselves were more likely to prefer more than two children (gamma = -.19). As we
might expect those who are less convinced that children are ‘life’s greatest joy’ or are more
aware of children’s impact on parental freedom are less likely to favour such larger numbers
of children Table 10 summarises the effects, showing the value of gamma for the relationship
between respondents’ views on each statement and their ideal number of children.
All of the relationships are statistically significant at well below the 1% level, but the multi-
country sample in the ISSP survey was a large one, so that even quite small effects have a
strong likelihood of being detected. Table 11 shows the detail of the relationship between
views on abortion and on whether those wanting to be parents should get married and
preferred number of children, to illustrate the size of effects. Finally insofar as the survey
collected information about behaviour relevant to marriage and the family, this seemed to be
consistent with these attitudes. Those who had cohabited with their present partner before
marriage (gamma = 0.19) those with any experience of cohabitation (with their present
cohabitee or another person) (gamma = 0.15) and those who had ever been divorced (gamma
= 0.17), or whose current partner had been divorced (gamma = 0.14) were all less likely than
others in couples to favour three or more children.
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Table 10.- Attitudes on marriage, children and families by ideal number of children.
Europe 1994
% agreeing (strongly) or saying never or only sometimes wrong





A pregnant woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion for
any reason whatsoever, if she chooses not to have the baby.
54 - . 2 7 1597
0
Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman
have sexual relations before marriage?
83 - . 2 6 1599
5
What if they are in their early teens, say under 16 years old, in
that case is it ...( wrong or not wrong)?
24 - . 2 2 1597
9
It is alright for a couple to live together without intending to get
married.
64 - . 2 0 1596
7
What about a married person having sexual relations with
someone other than his or her husband or wife, is it…(wrong or
not wrong)?
13 - . 1 9 1599
1
It's a good idea for a couple who intend to get married to live
together-first.
59 - . 1 9 1596
6
Having children interferes too much with the freedom of parents. 27 - . 1 5 1596
8
Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to
work out their marriage.
64 - . 1 4 1596
3
And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same
sex, is it ... ( wrong or not wrong)?
34 - . 1 0 1598
2
One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together. 36 - . 0 7 1595
9
The main advantage of marriage is that it gives financial security. 28 - . 0 5 1595
4
People who have never had children lead empty lives. 40 . 0 4 1596
4
Married people are generally happier than unmarried people. 29 . 0 8 1597
9
It is better to have a bad marriage than no marriage at all. 5 . 0 8 1594
8
The main purpose of marriage these days is to have children. 26 . 1 3 1595
2
People who want children ought to get married. 55 . 1 3 1594
0
Even when there are no children, a married couple should stay
together even if they don't get along.
8 . 1 4 1596
9
Watching children grow up is life's greatest joy. 84 . 1 5 1597
3
When there are children in the family, parents should stay together
even if they don't get along.
25 . 1 6 1596
4
* Percentages show the proportion of respondents who chose the relevant options. Those not asked were
treated as missing, but those saying ‘don’t know’ ‘cannot choose’ or ‘neither agree nor disagree’ are included in
the total from which the percentage shown is calculated. Source: ISSP 2620 Author’s analysis
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People who want children ought to get married.
None or
one child
3.9 3.7 5.3 5.4 9.2 4.9
Two
children




32.5 28.4 26.7 24.5 21.9 27.5
(N) 2904 5599 1684 3366 1459 15012
A pregnant woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion for any reason whatsoever, if she chooses
not to have the baby.
None or
one child
9.0 4.5 4.9 2.8 2.3 4.9
Two
children




19.2 22.5 26.6 33.1 42.1 27.4
(N) 3295 4466 1583 2770 2326 14440
A second key set of influences comes from attitudes towards women and work. Those who
take a more egalitarian view of sex roles, including parental ones, or who approve of women or
mothers working, tend to favour smaller family sizes. This is shown in Table 12. There are
some problems with question wording and its interpretation: in particular it there is a clear
distinction between believing that women ought to be able to choose to combine employment
of different kinds with being a parent of a child at various stages of development, and thinking
that women ‘should’ work outside the home.
Of course people’s imagined preferences as described to a social survey interviewer may vary
from their actual behaviour, but the ISSP survey gathered evidence on the latter as well.
Respondents were asked about their own work histories if they had had dependent children,
those of their partners and finally whether their mother had ever worked outside the home for
at least a year at any time up until their own fourteenth birthday. The answers to these
questions also confirmed the importance of women’s employment. If we confine our attention
to those respondents who were living or had lived in a couple, we find that those respondents
whose own mothers had been employed when they themselves were children (gamma = .23),
respondents (both male and female) from couples where both did paid work (gamma = .26),
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or from couples where the woman had done paid work when they had children – either part
time or full time - before they reached school age (gamma = .20), were all more likely to
prefer only one or two children rather than a greater number.
Table 12.- Attitudes about women and work
% agreeing (strongly) with the following statements or saying






Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent
person
67 - . 1 2 15934
Most women have to work these days to support their families 70 - . 1 2 15978
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a
relationship with her children as a mother who does not work
66 - . 1 1 15984
Both the man and woman should contribute to the household
income
70 - . 1 1 15944
Families should receive financial benefits for child care when
both parents work
46 - . 0 4 15959
Working women should receive paid maternity leave when
they have a baby
87 - . 0 3 15974
Family life often suffers because men concentrate too much on
their work
60 . 0 6 15978
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother
works
54 . 0 8 15929
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after
the home and family
30 . 0 9 15974
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time
job
50 . 1 0 15948
A job is alright-but what most women really want is a home
and children
35 . 1 2 15931
Being a house wife is just as fulfilling as working for pay. 38 . 1 4 15945
Do you think that women should work outside the home full-
time, part-time or not at all under these circumstances:
After marrying and before there are children. 87 . 1 3 15948
When there is a child under school age. 35 . 1 1 15922
After the youngest child starts school. 77 . 0 8 15913
After the children leave home. 83 . 0 2 15913
This remains true when we control for age, and indeed these variables have a stronger effect
on those in their thirties and forties: precisely those who are most likely to be having and
brining up young children. Table 13 shows the results for this age group comparing three
categories of parents across Europe. The first is those who mothers worked when they
themselves were children and who worked themselves (if they were women) or whose
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partners worked (if they were men) when they had pre-school age children. The second
comprises respondents for which one, but not both of these conditions holds and the third
comprises those whose mothers stayed at home and who also did so themselves (if they were
women) or whose partners did (if they were men).
Table 13.- Preferred number of children by family work history: adults 30 – 49, Europe
1 9 9 4
Ideal number
of children








None or one 7.4 5.0 3.3 5.2
Two 74.7 69.2 62.0 68.8
More than
two
17.9 25.9 34.7 26.0
N 1339 1715 1259 4313
Source: Author’s analysis ISSP 2620.
9.- Parental identity and theories of fertility: the economic context
The results presented above suggest that both economic factors in general and women’s
employment in particular are a key context within which parental identity is developed. Yet
within demography the integration of sociological and economic arguments in a way that gives
sociology a proper role has been problematic. Easterlin’s widely criticised synthesis (1978)
relegated sociology to a mere theory of the origin of utility preferences. Economic issues are
clearly important for how people think about children, but are profoundly ambivalent in their
effects. For example, in Spain in 1998, CIS study no 2283 found that four out of five
respondents cited ‘family economics’ (razones economicas familiares) as a major explanation
for people having fewer children than desired. Respondents who had children, but fewer than
they would ideally wish, were also more likely to cite such reasons than any other. Such
‘economic reasons’ as cited by respondents in several other surveys centre on three
interrelated issues: time, resources and the division of paid and unpaid work (including
childcare) between (potential or actual) mothers and fathers.
Care of children both requires time and resources in itself and also creates corresponding
opportunity costs: time or money spent on children is time or money unavailable for other
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activities. It is thus hardly surprising that experience of women’s employment figured as
prominently as it did in the results reviewed above from the ISSP study.
However the relationship between these three factors and fertility has always been an ambiguous
one. The controversy surrounding its analysis goes back to the birth of demography itself.
Malthus (1817) thought that rising incomes must mean rising population: higher living
standards reduced ‘checks’ on population caused by absolute material want and made it
possible for parents to have the number of children they desired. But as early as 1890, Dumont
argued that ‘attraction capillaire’ – his term for social mobility – would lead families to reduce
their fertility. He argued that rising living standards increased the direct costs of children by
opening up new possibilities for social advancement for offspring in whom enough resources
had been invested, and increased their opportunity costs by creating a greater range of leisure
activities or forms of consumption for parents that competed with the time needed for childcare.
This was potentially true both diachronically (comparing individual parents, families or societies
over time) and synchronically (comparing parents, families or societies of different levels of
wealth or income at the same time).
Dumont’s arguments have been developed by Landry (1909), Davis (1937) and incorporated
into the central tenets of transition theory by Notestein (1945). Meanwhile the ideas of
Malthus have essentially been restated by Becker (1960, 1991). The contemporary form of
this paradox is controversy over the impact of rising women’s employment on fertility. Those
who follow Dumont and Davis argue that its long term effect is negative and that it is thus the
erosion of the male breadwinner system that explains below replacement fertility. They might
even point to elements of Becker’s theory to sustain their arguments. He argued that,
regardless of working hours, economic growth increases the relative scarcity of time by
increasing its utility and opportunity cost (Becker 1965, see also Linder, 1970). In richer
societies people have more potential activities competing for their time, and more material
resources to pursue these activities. Meanwhile, Baumol (1967) demonstrated that
‘technologically non-progressive’ service activities must become progressively more costly as
economic growth produces continual technological innovation: a steadily rising proportion of
societies’ resources must be taken up by activities that by their nature cannot benefit from
technological innovation. Baumol cited the example of live performance: a string quartet, play
or opera cannot be ‘rationalised’ or speeded up, although it may be increasingly replaced by
recording, broadcasting or other forms of reproduction. Child-care is perhaps the perfect
example of a technologically non-progressive activity. To be sure there have been various
technological innovations (disposable nappies, bottle feeding, pre-prepared baby-food, alarms,
children’s videos) but none of these substitute for the relatively full attention of a responsible
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adult. On the contrary, the increased specialisation and rationalisation of the division of labour
in modern societies make it less easy to combine childcare with other activities: whether of
production or consumption. Childcare was more easily combined with both when a less
extensive division of labour and subsistence production and consumption made it possible for
children to be present at both these processes.
If we put these arguments together we can conclude that as technical innovation occurs and
disposable income rises, the relative productivity of childcare decreases so that its cost
increases, while the relative scarcity of time increases increasing its opportunity costs. We thus
face that paradox that as the standard of living rises, the ‘economic’ constraints on childbearing
and rearing increase. Parents find it more difficult to distribute their time between employment
and family even in the absence of any social change. If, however, we add in the effects of the
collapse of the male breadwinner system, it is hardly surprising that ‘reconciliation’ of work
and family life now looms so large in policy frameworks. We face a ‘law’ here rather similar to
Marx’s arguments about technological innovation and labour intensity. Mechanisation, rather
than simply reducing the burden of work (although it might indeed reduce its physical intensity)
places a premium on the most efficient possible use of new technology, so that the pressure to
work intensively tends to increase. The difference, of course, is that rather like a life performance
of a string quartet, bringing up children cannot be intensified or subject to speed up, at least not
without similar consequences for the quartet or the child.
Those who follow Becker tend to argue that increased living standards ultimately make it
possible for parents to have more children, or children of higher quality (that is, children with
greater amounts of time and resources invested in their upbringing). We can even place
Myrdal in this tradition, insofar as her work on population and employment assumed that
there was an almost pre-social ‘demand’ for children which social arrangements could either
facilitate or repress: ‘… it is tacitly taken for granted that some desire to have children exists
in mankind and that this desire has remained fairly constant. It can hardly be
analysed…’(Myrdal 1941:53) Such arguments can take two forms. On the one hand, those
with substantial faith in market mechanisms, such as Becker himself, believe that such
developments as the market delivery of childcare services will eventually ‘correct’ short term
deficiencies in the demand for and supply of children. On the other hand, those such as
Esping-Andersen (1998) or Castles (2001) who insist on the central role of the state in
managing risk, externalities and inter-generational arrangements follow Myrdal in arguing that
the proper organisation of social policy, including monetary transfers, service provision and
pregnancy and childcare related employment rights, can push fertility trends in the right
direction.
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Graph 4.- Cross Country correlation of female participation rate and total fertility rate:
OECD 1975 – 1995
Source: Ahn & Mira 1998
Such theorists frequently point to the recent reversal in the cross sectional relationship
between the level of women’s employment and fertility in OECD countries as evidence of a
changing, more positive relationship between women’s employment and fertility. For example
Ahn and Mira produce graph 4, based on the changing correlation coefficient between the
women’s participation rate (the proportion of women of working age who are either employed
or unemployed) and the total fertility rate for member countries of the OECD between 1975
and 1995, and use it to suggest, as do Castles 2001 and Esping-Andersen 1998, that there is
now a positive relationship between women’s employment and fertility since countries with
higher fertility rates also tend to be the countries with higher female participation rates.
However it is always problematic to infer longitudinal developments from cross sectional
evidence for two reasons. First, treating individual countries as cases in this way implies (as
less cautious economists sometimes tend to do) that we can search for general laws equally
applicable across an analytically homogeneous space and time, so that one country’s present
might show us another country’s future. This rather heroically ignores the particular
complexities and vicissitudes of the development of individual societies and the evolution, for
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example of their state and social policy systems. Thus we know that in the time period covered
by this graph countries such as Italy and Spain which had hitherto had high fertility rates and
low levels of women’s employment experienced a sharp fall in fertility rates, while women’s
employment expanded from a very low base. Conversely fertility rates in Scandinavian
countries (which had had high levels of women’s employment for some time) fell much less,
thus changing the cross country correlation coefficient, despite the fact that within almost all
individual countries the total fertility rate continued to fall and women’s employment to rise.
The change in the relationship might simply be a function of composition effects.
Second, this approach, like some others in demography, ignores the crucial impact of feedback
effects: awareness of the results of research directly affects the objects of studies (Oppenheim
Mason 1997). The potential and reality of reflexivity is fundamental. Individuals and policy
makers learn from history (whether well or badly is irrelevant here) and attempting to alter their
behaviour, or indeed to make efforts to preserve their ‘traditional’ behaviour or attitudes in the
face of pressures to change them. Social actors (such as the state in developing societies) are
aware both of the history of more developed societies and of the results of social research on
both types of society. Another way of thinking of this is of the need for demographic analyses
to be appropriately aware of the nature of society itself. The conception underpinning Ahn and
Mira’s approach (and those of many others) is of societies as an ensemble of social relations
and institutions understandable in terms of ‘variables’ which are (in principle if not always in
practice) measurable, and correlated and to which causality is attributable given a conception of
time as linear, homogeneous and progressive. But this is a fundamentally ‘modern’ conception
of society, that social actors outside the Western Europe and North America from the
seventeenth centuries onward, together with regions of the world influenced by these societies,
would struggle to recognise (Anderson 1991).
Finally, while Ahn and Mira use participation rates, for our analytical purposes the relative
female employment rate would be more useful, since it controls for changes in employment
levels resulting from changes in the general level of economic activity across the business cycle.
Graph 5 thus uses longitudinal evidence directly, and reveals a different story behind the
aggregate changes in cross sectional patterns portrayed by Ahn and Mira. The graph plots the
relation between the relative female employment rate and the total fertility rate for each country
for the two years 1990 and 2000.
Graph 5
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Total Fertility Rate and Relative Female Employment Rate 
Europe 1990 & 2000
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The arrows show the change over that decade for each country. Thus arrows pointing
downward indicate a fall in a country’s fertility rate, and those pointing rightwards indicate an
increase in the relative female employment rate. Were there any consistent relationship
between fertility and women’s employment we would expect the arrows to have a roughly
similar slope, and were this relationship to be positive we would expect the direction of the
arrows to slope upward and to the right. The graph also shows the regression line obtained
from a cross sectional analysis of the relationship between the TFR and RFER in the two
years. The results show clearly that there is no consistent relationship over this decade
between women’s employment and fertility in Western Europe. For a minority of countries
there is a positive relationship: France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. For others
there is a strong negative relationship: Ireland, the UK, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain,
Germany and Austria. In Finland both the absolute and relative employment rate of women
fell in this period, while in Sweden women’s and men’s employment fell at about the same
rate. Both countries experienced a fall in fertility: especially pronounced in the case of
Sweden. It is instructive to compare the experience of these two countries with Denmark.
Although these three countries might be thought to have similar ‘welfare regimes’, their
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demographic and employment experiences over this period could hardly have been more
different. This suggests that to understand the impact of women’s employment on fertility we
need to generate and understand a range of intervening variables that can make sense of such
divergent experience. In the light of the discussion above, a conceptualisation of these
variables in terms of parental identity and the material constraints within which it is developed
might well prove fruitful.
Finally it is useful to look at the contrast between the slope of the arrows and the slope of the
two cross sectional regression lines for 1990 and 2000. These regression lines summarise the
evidence that could be gleaned from a cross sectional analysis in each year. They indeed slope
upward, indicating a positive cross sectional relationship between employment and fertility,
and the slope increases slightly in 2000 – indicating a more positive relationship which is
consistent with Ahn and Mira’s evidence. The graph shows clearly, however that this cross
sectional data gives a quite misleading summary of a complex picture.
In passing we might also note that there is no example of an arrow sloping upward and to the
left: a situation of declining women’s relative employment and increasing fertility. Such a
scenario is that advocated by conservative observers of the family and employment who
advocate a return to something like the male breadwinner system (e.g. Fukuyama 1999,
Kristol 1998). I am not aware of any country, over any recent period, which has experienced
such a change, nor is it easy to imagine the conditions under which it might come about: it
remains a case of conservative wishful thinking. As Myrdal put it over half a century ago:
‘The fertility of working wives might be low but nobody should think that these wives would
bear more children if they were compelled to stay at home and their families were deprived of
part of their incomes. (1941: 403).’
10.- Conclusion: parental identity and a ‘right to parent’?
Let me review what has been a rather varied and complex argument. I began by arguing that
below replacement fertility is a matter of both analytical sociological interest and practical
policy concern. I went on to suggest that while there is some consensus about what are the
main social factors influencing fertility, there is none over how best to theorise them properly
or how they interrelate. I then reviewed some of the intellectual history of relevant sociological
and demographic debates and tried to put them in a historical context of changing social and
political concern with fertility and substantial social change in the way that households and
families relate to employment. I suggested that the difficulties encountered in theorising these
changes is due in part to the unacknowledged dependency of much of the sociology of the
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family on a ‘male breadwinner’ model of reproduction long after social change has rendered
it obsolete. I then reviewed some empirical evidence that appeared to confirm the influence on
fertility aspirations of women’s employment and the collapse of the male breadwinner system
and its associated ideologies on the one hand, and changes in attitudes towards family and
marital obligations and the rise of reflexive ‘identity’ and life-project discourses on the other.
I suggested that these changes might usefully be understood using a concept of ‘parental
identity’ to grasp changing ideas about the nature and organisation of parenthood, including
the obligations and rewards it comprises, and its reflexive relationship to individual life
projects. It includes changing views of what obligations parents owe children in terms of
emotional attachment and practical and material support and whether this differs between
mothers and fathers. It thus presupposes a model of what childhood comprises. Parental
identity is developed and negotiated within a variable set of social constraints: the time, income
and other material resources that members of a family have access to; networks of friends and
relations who can be drawn upon for support; relevant services and transfer income provided
by local and central government; employment arrangements and benefits provided by actual or
potential employers; legal constraints (e.g. family and inheritance law) and general social
mechanisms to deal with what Myrdal (1941) called the ‘cumbersomeness’ of children
(‘child friendly’ public spaces, transport facilities etc.).
Allied to the concept of parental identity, we might also wish to think of the concept of a ‘right
to parent’. Above, I quoted Goode (1964) in order to show how sociology has focused on
socialisation of infants rather than on their production in the first place. Another way of
understanding this is to argue that sociological analyses of modern industrial society have
tended to focus on the social relations of production at the expense of the social relations of
reproduction. For example, Marx analysed the conditions under which labour became
commoditised, and the social consequences of this historical development for other social
relations and institutions. Weber’s analysis of modernity focused on bureaucracy as the
institutional incarnation of formal rationality in the public sphere and its tendency to
incarcerate its unwitting authors in an unanticipated ‘iron cage’. Durkheim analysed the rise
of the organic forms of solidarity and its potential to create forced or anomic divisions of
labour. All three emphasised the potential for the new society to generate contradictions and
crises that required some form of public management. This has been a concern not only of the
nineteenth century 'founding fathers' of the discipline but of contemporary debates too, such
as those over the labour process or globalisation. At a political or practical level, critics have
argued that the demand for 'the right to work' or for ‘social citizenship’ (Marshall 1950)
underpins social progress by raising issues about the social relations within which people
work and the rewards they receive for it. Such demands have attempted to bring some form of
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collective social regulation to bear on individuals’ opportunities in the labour market by
positing the existence of a collective, social interest distinct from the immediate calculus of
choice that may face any given individual. Controversy has centred on how far it is possible to
check the potential of unregulated markets to cause disorder, chaos or socially unacceptable
levels of material inequality without undermining their ability to promote innovation or
individual liberty (e.g. Polanyi 1944, Wolfe 1989).
My argument here is that less sociological attention has been paid, however, to the crisis in
reproduction that modern industrial society appears to generate. Perhaps this might be better
brought into focus by thinking in terms of a ‘right to parent’ broadly analogous to other
elements of social citizenship such as a ‘right to work’ or to a minimum standard of living
and so on. The elaboration of such a right would raise such issues as how the increasingly
varied family forms of contemporary society can be guaranteed the resources in terms of time,
money and public services, that make it possible to undertake appropriate parenting; and it
could bring into focus the extent to which various social institutions discriminate, directly or
indirectly, between those who currently have or do not have parenting responsibilities of
various kinds. If such a concept were to encourage a more intense exchange of ideas between
demography and sociology, it would serve a very useful purpose indeed.
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